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STATE PRE-EMPTION AND
LOCAL LEGISLATION
Thomas M. Montgomery*
One pressing question currently facing local government is
whether cities and counties have the power to legislate in particular
fields. The basis for local legislation flows from article XI, section
11 of the California constitution, which provides: "Any county,
city, town, or township may make and enforce within its limits all
such local, police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in con-
flict with the general laws."
In attempting to ascertain whether a local regulation is "in
conflict" with the general laws, the situations generally fall into
three categories. First, there is specific constitutional or statutory
language reserving a field of legislation to the state.' Second, there
are some instances in which the Legislature has stated that cities
and counties may legislate in particular fields.2 Some times such
authority on the part of the local agency is qualified to the extent
that the local regulation must be stricter than state law8 or impose
equal or greater restrictions than those imposed by state law.4
If the Legislature has thus spoken, the only problem is to frame the
local legislation so that it falls within the defined limits. Third,
there are many situations in which there is state legislation in the
* A.B., Stanford University, 1939; LL.B., Hastings College of Law, 1948. Member,
California Bar. County Counsel, Humboldt County, California.
1 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22 in regard to the control of alcoholic bev-
erages. CAL. VEH. CODE § 21, another example, reads as follows: "Except as otherwise
expressly provided, the provisions of this code are applicable and uniform throughout
the State and in all counties and municipalities therein, and no local authority shall
enact or enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this code unless expressly
authorized herein." This category and the second category which is mentioned herein-
after in the body of this article are discussed in Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366,
371-72, 125 P.2d 482, 485 (1942).
2 See, e.g., CAL. VER. CODE § 21100 (processions or assemblages on highways,
licensing and regulating operation of vehicles for hire and traffic regulation), CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11540.1 (regulating division of land which is not a subdivision)
and CAL. HARB. & NAy. CODE § 660 (measures relating to use of undocumented vessels).
An interesting provision is found in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11525, which makes it
mandatory that every county and city adopt an ordinance regulating and controlling
the design and improvement of subdivisions.
3 CAL. HErAL & SAF. CODE § 24247, dealing with air pollution control, falls into
this category. This section commences with the following statement: "The Legislature
does not, by the provisions of this chapter, intend to occupy the field."
4 CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 17951, regarding building regulations, is an example
of this type of legislation.
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field, but nowhere in the state law is there any express indication
that local agencies may or may not legislate in the same field. It is
in this third category that most of the problems have arisen. This
article will deal with these problems.
BACKGROUND
The rule has been that if an entire field has been occupied by
the state, there is no room for local regulation.' The application
of this rule has presented difficulty. Some of the older cases indi-
cated that so long as no direct conflict exists as to the subject matter
of regulation, the entire field has not been occupied by the state
and the local agency is free to adopt further regulations.6 Perhaps
the test in these cases was whether there was a conflict rather than
whether the entire field had been occupied.
Although In re Lane7 is usually considered to be the landmark
case in applying a new approach to test whether the Legislature
has intended to occupy the entire field, there had been considerable
erosion of the earlier view prior to Lane. The Lane case repre-
sents not so much a new concept as an explanation of what had
already happened to the law.
TRANSITIONAL CASES
Probably the most important case decided prior to Lane was
Abbott v. City of Los Angeles,8 in which a city "criminal registra-
tion act" was held unconstitutional because the state had already
occupied or pre-empted the field in enacting parts of the Penal
Code. The court stated:
While it is true that Penal Code, section 290 is the only criminal
registration statute enacted by the state, a review of various related
state enactments concerning recidivistic criminology leads unerringly
to the conclusion that the Legislature has adopted a clear policy based
upon the dual presumptions that certain criminals are recidivistic and
5 Language to this effect, citing a number of earlier cases, is contained in Natural
Milk Assn. v. City of San Francisco, 20 Cal. 2d 101, 124 P.2d 25 (1942), as well as in
In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962).
6 In re Iverson, 199 Cal. 582, 250 Pac. 681 (1926) stated that the state had not
occupied the entire field in its detailed regulations for the issuance of prescriptions for
alcoholic liquor; it is to be noted, however, that the state legislation expressly
allowed local regulation, so the rule of the Iverson case is dictum and properly
belongs in the second category listed at the beginning of this article. See cases col-
lected in original dissenting opinion of In re Lane prior to the decision on rehearing,
367 P.2d 673, 675, 18 Cal. Rptr. 33, 39 (1962).
7 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962).
8 53 Cal. 2d 674, 349 P.2d 974, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1960).
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others are not, and that certain types of crime require registration and
others do not.9
The court also stated:
An examination of the Penal Code also indicates that the state Legis-
lature has preempted the very field of registration as a means of
apprehension of criminals. This it has done by expressly requiring regis-
tration in some instances and by inferentially rejecting it in others.
Thus, in this basic respect the state statutes and the local ordinance
are in conflict.' 0
In the Abbott case the court cited a number of California
Supreme Court cases, in which certain fields had been pre-empted
by the state. These fields were regulation of traffic on public high-
ways," presentation of claims for damages against local bodies,' 2
tests for loyalty as prerequisite to public employment,' 8 and a
county "right to work" ordinance. 4 In commenting upon these
cases the court stated that the fields mentioned
have all been held to have been preempted by the state, to the exclu-
sion of local legislation, not because the language in the state statutes
denied the subject matter to local bodies, nor because the local body
attempted to enact a measure which would do violence to the already
existing state provisions, but because there existed a statewide legis-
lative scheme which was intended to occupy the field.
15
The Abbott decision, relying on Pipoly v. Benson,'" deals with
the meaning of the term "conflict" in the following manner: "Thus,
the term 'conflict' as used in section 11 of article XI has been held
not to be limited to a mere conflict in language, but applies equally
to a conflict of jurisdiction.""' The court states that this definition
is necessary in order to prevent dual regulations, which could result
in uncertainty and confusion, and is not based upon the superior
authority of the state.
9 Id. at 686, 349 P.2d at 982.
10 Id. at 685, 349 P.2d at 981-82.
11 Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942).
12 Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles, 29 Cal. 2d 661, 177 P.2d 558 (1947).
13 Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal. 2d 708, 249 P.2d 280 (1952); Bowen v. Sargent,
39 Cal. 2d 714, 249 P.2d 285 (1952).
14 Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d 162, 339 P.2d 801 (1959). The following language,
which is contained in the concurring opinion of Justice McComb, states another ground
for holding the ordinance invalid: "In addition, it is my view that the field has been
occupied by the people of the United States and by the people of the State of California
by the adoption of the Constitution of this state." 52 Cal. 2d at 217, 339 P.2d at 836.
This statement has reference to the right of individuals to contract with each other.
15 Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 682-83, 349 P.2d 974, 980, 3
Cal. Rptr. 158, 164 (1960).
16 Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942).
17 Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 682, 349 P.2d 974, 979, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 158, 163 (1960).
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It is also pointed out in Abbot that article XI, section 11 of
the constitution involves not only a delegation of power, but is also
a limitation on the local body. Another significant point is con-
tained in the following language:
When there is a doubt as to whether an attempted regulation relates
to a municipal or to a state matter, or if it be the mixed concern of both,
the doubt must be resolved in favor of the legislative authority of
the state. .... 18
Although this rule purports to deal just with the question of whether
a municipal or a state matter is involved, the court indicates that
the rule applies to
prevent any legislation by a local body (other than in furtherance of
the state law) when the entire field, that is the subject matter of the
ordinance, has already been fully occupied by the state. Thus the con-
stitution prohibits a city from imposing additional requirements in a
state occupied field . . . or from punishing the same act denounced
by state law .... 19
It appears, therefore, that any doubt as to whether a field has been
fully occupied by the state must be resolved in favor of the state.
Another leading case decided not long before Lane was Agnew
v. City of Los Angeles.2 0 There the court in a five-to-two decision
held that the state, by the adoption of sections 7000-7145 of the
Business and Professions Code, had pre-empted the field of regu-
lating contractors. The dissent did not represent a judicial cleavage
on the pre-emption issue. It was based upon the interpretation
that the city ordinance in question was partially a license tax for
revenue purposes; the regulatory portion dealt only with the quality
and character of electrical installations, not with the qualifications
of persons making installations.
THE LANE CASE
Viewed in the light of the California Supreme Court decisions
of the two preceding decades, the case of In re Lane21 comes as
something of an anticlimax. Carol Lane was convicted of two
charges of the crime of "resorting," which was a violation of the
Los Angeles Municipal Code. The evidence showed that in each
instance the defendent had gone from the living room to the bed-
room of her home for the purpose of having sexual intercourse with
18 Id. at 681, 349 P.2d at 979, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 163. (Emphasis added.)
19 Id. at 682, 349 P.2d at 979, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
20 51 Cal. 2d 1, 330 P.2d 385 (1958). The Agnew case is among the cases cited and
discussed in the Abbott case.
21 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962).
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a male to whom she was not married. In ordering the petitioner
(the defendant in the criminal action) discharged from the cus-
tody on a writ of habeas corpus, the court framed the issue in this
manner:
This is the sole question for us to determine: Has the state adopted
a general scheme for the regulation of the criminal aspects of sexual
activity and determined, to the exclusion of local regulation, when
sexual intercourse between persons not married to each other shall
be criminal?22
The answer of the majority, in a five-to-two decision, was in the
affirmative. The court, prior to enumerating laws which had been
passed by the Legislature regulating various types of sexual activi-
ties, stated: "The Penal Code sections covering the criminal aspects
of sexual activity are so extensive in their scope that they clearly
show an intention by the Legislature to adopt a general scheme
for the regulation of this subject. '23 After reviewing the state laws,
the court noted that although state law prohibits living in a state
of cohabitation and adultery, neither fornication or adultery alone,
nor living in the state of cohabitation and fornication, has been
made a crime in California. Relying on Abbott the court held: "It
is therefore clear that the Legislature has determined by implication
that such conduct shall not be criminal in this state.
' 24
Until Lane some continued to believe, in spite of the trend of
the decisions, that local agencies could impose further regulations,
regardless of state legislation. This point was squarely raised in
Justice Dooling's dissenting opinion with Justice White concurring:
It has always been the law in this state, until this decision, that where
the Legislature has prohibited certain conduct the cities and counties
under the express grant of power contained in the California Consti-
tution, section 11, article XI, could prohibit other and different con-
duct in the same field by local ordinance.
25
In answer to the dissent the majority opinion cited certain cases2"
which "specifically recognize that where the state has fully occu-
pied the field, there is no room for additional requirements by local
legislation. '27 The court held that any statements in the other cases
22 Id. at 102, 372 P.2d at 898, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
23 Id. at 103, 372 P.2d at 899, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
24 Id. at 104, 372 P.2d at 900, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
25 Id. at 112, 372 P.2d at 905, 22 Cal. Rptr. 865. The dissenting opinion makes
reference to a more complete collection of cases supporting the rule asserted by the
dissent which appeared in the original dissenting opinion (367 P.2d 673 at 675, 18
Cal. Rptr. 33, 39 (1961)) prior to the decision on rehearing.
26 In re Iverson, 199 Cal. 582, 250 Pac. 681 (1926); In re Simmons, 199 Cal.
590, 250 Pac. 684 (1926) ; Mann v. Scott, 180 Cal. 550, 182 Pac. 281 (1919).
27 58 Cal. 2d at 105, 372 P.2d at 900, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
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cited28 which would lead to a contrary conclusion had already been
overruled by the Pipoly, Agnew, and Abbott cases.
Chief Justice Gibson wrote a concurring opinion and two of the
justices who concurred in the majority opinion also concurred with
him. He disapproved of some of the language of earlier cases and
stated: "It is thus apparent that the enactment by the state of a
comprehensive and detailed general plan or scheme with respect
to a subject serves, without more, to occupy the field to the exclu-
sion of local regulation."2 9 The Chief Justice also pointed out,
citing Tolman v. Underhill 0 and Abbott, that one of the factors
to be taken into consideration is whether or not the subject calls
for uniform treatment throughout the state. In reaching the con-
clusion that uniform treatment was required, he pointed out that
in many areas "there is one continuous urban community, with
boundary lines serving only to demark different political entities."'"
He stated that in 1961 Los Angeles County alone contained seventy-
one incorporated municipalities. To enforce different laws on one
subject would result in much unnecessary confusion and uncer-
tainty.
It is clear that the Lane case sounded the death knell to any
philosophy holding that there is room for additional regulation of
a local nature once the state has adopted a general scheme for the
regulation of a field.
RECENT DECISIONS
The decisions subsequent to the Lane case dealing with pre-
emption represent primarily the application of the pre-emption
doctrine to various fields.
In re Moss-2 was decided less than a month after the Lane
case. In a habeas corpus proceeding arising out of a conviction
for violation of a section of the Los Angeles Municipal Code pro-
hibiting indecent shows, it was held that the state occupied the
field by the enactment of various Penal Code sections. Justice
White, one of the dissenters in the Lane case, concurred in the
judgment and wrote a concurring opinion. He stated that he still
28 In re Hoffman, 155 Cal. 114, 99 Pac. 517 (1909); Odd Fellows' Cemetery Assn.
v. City and County of San Francisco, 140 Cal. 226, 73 Pac. 987 (1903) ; In re Murphy,
128 Cal. 29, 60 Pac. 465 (1900) ; Ex parte Hong Shen, 98 Cal. 681, 33 Pac. 799 (1893) ;
Ex parte Johnson, 73 Cal. 228, 15 Pac. 43 (1887); and In re Sic, 73 Cal. 142, 14 Pac.
405 (1887).
29 58 Cal. 2d at 109, 372 P.2d at 903, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
80 39 Cal. 2d 708, 249 P.2d 280 (1952).
31 58 Cal. 2d at 111, 372 P.2d at 904, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
82 58 Cal. 2d 117, 373 P.2d 425, 23 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1962).
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adhered to the views expressed in the dissenting opinions in the
Lane case. He succinctly summarized his philosophy in the follow-
ing language:
In other words, the mere fact that the Legislature has entered a
certain field through legislation therein does not justify the impli-
cations that it has preempted that field to the exclusion of local
legislation in the same field unless it can justly and reasonably be
said that the local ordinance is in conflict with the Constitution or
with the provisions of the state law.88
His concurrence was on the ground that the ordinance did not
involve new and additional regulations, but punished the same act
denounced by state law. This, he believed, manifested the clear
intention of the Legislature to occupy the field in its entirety, there-
by creating a conflict and making the ordinance void. 4
The Moss case was relied on and a similar result reached in
Whitney v. Municipal Court,85 which involved a portion of the
San Francisco Municipal Code prohibiting "any motion picture
exhibition, or entertainment of any sort which is offensive to
decency, or which excites vicious or lewd thoughts or acts . . . or
which is lewd or obscene or vulgar . . . or so suggestive as to be
offensive to the moral sense." 6
In Mier v. Municipal Court37 it was held that "by virtue
of section 311 of the Penal Code the state had occupied the field
with respect to the criminal aspects of selling, distributing, keeping
for sale, exhibiting, and advertising obscene and indecent publica-
tion .... ,,88
A part of the Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibiting the
possession of bookmaking notations was before the court in the
case of In re Loretizo.39 The court held that the state, through
section 377a of the Penal Code, had occupied the field regarding the
criminal aspects of wagering on horse races.
Another gambling case, In re Allen,4° is of interest because
of its dissenting opinion. The game involved was bridge. The
majority opinion concluded that bridge is not predominantly a
3 Id. at 120, 373 P.2d at 427, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
84 Justice Dooling, the author of the Lane dissents, did not take part in the Moss
decision. He had retired a few days before, and Justice White retired on October 31,
1962, prior to the next pre-emption case coming before the California Supreme Court.
85 58 Cal. 2d 907, 377 P.2d 80, 27 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1962).
36 Id. at 909, 377 P.2d at 81, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
87 211 Cal. App. 2d 470, 27 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1962).
88 Id. at 472, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 603-04.
39 59 Cal. 2d 445, 380 P.2d 656, 30 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1963).
40 59 Cal. 2d 5, 377 P.2d 280, 27 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1962).
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game of chance. Justice McComb, who had written the majority
opinion in the Lane case, wrote a dissenting opinion, concurred
in by Justice Schauer, in which he decided that bridge is a game of
chance. The dissent upheld the ordinance by concluding that there
is room for local regulation in this field. This conclusion was based
on the failure of the Legislature, during a period of over sixty
years following a supreme court decision4' upholding the validity
of further regulations in the field by a municipality, to take any
action either to increase the scope of state regulation or to exclude
local regulation. Unfortunately, there is no indication of the ma-
jority view on this point.
In re Koehne,42 In re Zorn,4" and People v. Lopes" deal with
"drunk ordinances," the first two involving Los Angeles and the
last, Pomona. Each case held without dissent that the state had
adopted a general scheme for the regulation of the criminal aspects
of intoxication in a public place. These decisions resulted from the
enactment in 1961 of section 647(f) of the Penal Code as a part
of the new "disorderly conduct" law.45
An interesting dictum is contained in American Civil Liberties
Union v. Board of Education,46 which involved the right to the use
of a school building under the Civic Center Act. The court states
that where a statute which authorizes local authorities to legislate
is held unconstitutional on other grounds, this does not eliminate
the statement of legislative intent authorizing local legislation. The
court seemed to assume that a board of education has police power
under article XI, section 11 of the constitution, although school
districts are not mentioned in this provision.
The companion cases of Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles4 7 and International Assn. of Fire Fighters
v. City of Palo Alto4 8 dealt with the question whether certain pro-
visions of the Labor Code49 and Government Code, ° involving
41 In re Murphy, 128 Cal. 29, 60 Pac. 465 (1900).
42 59 Cal. 2d 646, 381 P.2d 633, 30 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1963).
43 59 Cal. 2d 650, 381 P.2d 635, 30 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1963).
44 59 Cal. 2d 653, 381 P.2d 637, 30 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1963).
45 The new statute and these decisions shifted the financial responsibility of
caring for persons convicted of being drunk in public places from the cities to the
counties in cases of county jail incarceration following arrests made in cities. Pre-
viously the responsibility had rested with the cities because incarceration was for
violation of city ordinances, not the state law. See 22 OPs. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 209 (1953).
46 59 Cal. 2d 203, 379 P.2d 4, 28 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1963).
47 60 A.C. 227, 384 P.2d 158, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1963).
48 60 A.C. 246, 384 P.2d 170, 32 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1963).
49 CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1960-63. These sections are applicable to employees of
fire departments and fire services of public agencies.
50 CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 3500-09. These sections are applicable to public employees
generally.
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labor relations of public employers and employees, were applicable
to firemen employed by chartered cities. The court stated that
the controlling question was whether the matters involved were of
municipal or state-wide concern. It concluded "that the Legislature
was attempting to deal with labor relations on a state-wide basis, ' 51
and that state law controlled over charter provisions, ordinances,
and other local regulations. The court stressed the fact that sec-
tion 923 of the Labor Code set out general provisions applicable
to labor and management throughout the state, that the Government
Code52 narrowed the matter to public employees, and that other sec-
tions of the Labor Code58 narrowed the matter further to fire depart-
ment and fire service employees. In the Professional Fire Fighters
case the court stated:
Labor relations are of the same state-wide concern as workmen's
compensation, liability of municipalities for tort, perfecting and filing
of claims, and the requirement to subscribe to loyalty oaths (see
Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal. 2d 708 (249 P.2d 280)), all of which
have been held to be governed by general law in contravention of
local regulation by chartered cities. 54
The Appellate Department of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, relying on the earlier case of People v. Commons,55
held in People v. Jenkins56 that the state had not pre-empted the
field of regulation of deadly weapons by the enactment of section
12025 of the Penal Code so as to invalidate a section of the Los
Angeles Municipal Code. The municipal code went beyond the
state law and made it a crime for a guest riding in the back seat
of a car to have a loaded revolver concealed under the carpet on
the floor of the car. The court emphasized the statement of Chief
Justice Gibson in his concurring opinion in the Lane case5 7 to the
effect that one of the factors to be considered is whether the subject
calls for uniform treatment throughout the state. In this regard the
court stated:
The danger from gunmen in a large city is much greater than in a
sparsely settled rural area and is a more frequent occurrence. The
weapon which the appellant had in his possession was not only dan-gerous and deadly but it was loaded. It is unthinkable that the Legis-
51 Professional Fire Fighters Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 A.C. 227, 245, 384
P.2d 158, 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 841 (1963).
52 CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 3500-09.
53 CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1960-63.
54 60 A.C. at 246, 384 P.2d at 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. 241.
55 64 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 925, 148 P.2d 724 (1944).
56 207 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 904, 24 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1962).
57 In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 110, 372 P.2d 897, 903-04, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 864
(1962).
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lature intended to deny the public in Los Angeles the protection which
the ordinance gives.58
Later the same court that decided the Jenkins case considered
the same provisions of the Los Angeles Municipal Code in People
v. Bass,59 although apparently a different subsection was involved.
The defendant was charged with carrying a concealed knife, though
not a switch-blade knife, over three inches in length. The applicable
municipal code provisions, as paraphrased by the court, stated:
"'No person... shall wear or in any manner carry concealed upon
his person . . . any dirk or dagger; any knife with a blade three
inches or more in length, and any snap-blade or spring-blade knife,
regardless of the length of the blade.' ,,60 The court pointed out
that The Dangerous Weapons Control Law6 made it a felony for
one to carry a dirk or dagger concealed upon his person, and that
in 1957 the Legislature had added section 653k to the Penal
Code, making it a misdemeanor for one to carry concealed upon
his person a switch-blade knife having a blade of over two inches
in length. It also pointed out that the word "concealed" was deleted
from section 653k in 1959, thereby causing still more of the
field to be occupied. The court stated, in reversing judgment follow-
ing conviction: "[W]e conclude that the Legislature, having pro-
hibited the carrying of dirks, daggers and switch-blade knives, has
not only itself not forbidden one to carry the. knife possessed by
the defendant, but has shut off the power of the City to forbid it."
62
It is not clear what the court in the Bass case intended to do
with the Jenkins case.68 There was no discussion of whether the
subject called for uniform treatment throughout the state.
Still another portion of the Los Angeles Municipal Code is
discussed in the case of In re Martin.64 The provision required any
person who desired to wear a mask or other disguise upon any
street, sidewalk or park to obtain a permit before doing so. The
court pointed out that section 185 of the Penal Code, dealing with
masks, false whiskers, and other disguises, makes such disguises
unlawful only if used in connection with the commission of a public
offense or concealment, flight or escape following commission of a
public offense. The Penal Code section does not require the act
to occur in a public place. Also the court took note of section 650a
58 207 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 907, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
59 33 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1963).
60 Id. at 366.
61 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 12000-520.
62 33 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
63 Id. at 367.
64 221 A.C.A. 14, 34 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1963).
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of the Penal Code,65 which deals further with masks and disguises.
It held that there was a conflict and that the Legislature had occu-
pied the entire field, thus the municipal code section was void.
The following language was used by the court in eunuciating the
rule:
It appears from the decisions that the general scheme for the regu-
lation of a particular subject may be found in a single comprehensive
statute such as the Vehicle Code, or in a section of the Penal Code,
or in a multiplicity of code sections which in the aggregate spell a
legislative attempt to occupy the whole or a part of the particular
field of legislation. 66
In Baldwin Park Water Dist. v. County of Los Angeles67 the
court considered the validity of a county ordinance requiring a
water utility certificate of registration or a water utility authoriza-
tion prior to the construction of any portion of a water system
which was subject to the ordinance. The ordinance stated that it
was enacted for the purpose of obtaining a minimum level of fire
protection in new subdivisions and residential, commercial, and
industrial improvements. Certain technical details were set out, and
discretionary authority was given to county officials in regard to
some of these details. There was a provision for an appeal, first to an
appeals board then to the board of supervisors.
The ordinance was attacked by water districts, of which four
were irrigation districts, nine, county water districts, and one, a
state water district. The court reviewed the various district acts and
concluded that the Legislature did not intend that the districts in
question should be subject to legislation by counties. It pointed out
that all three types of water districts were allowed to include terri-
tory in more than one county, and that there would be confusion
if each county and city in which a district had a portion of its
territory were to impose its own regulations. The court also pointed
out that, under state law, constructing a waterworks system for an
irrigation district or a county water district "is within the duties of
the district engineer or manager, subject to the approval of the
board of directors of the district, 68 while the ordinance required
a county certificate of registration or a water utility authorization.
65 CAL. PEN. CODE § 650a reads as follows: "It is a misdemeanor for any person,
either alone or in company with others, to appear on any street or highway, or in
other public places or any place open to view by the general public, with his face
partially or completely concealed by means of a mask or other regalia or parapher-
nalia, with intent thereby to conceal his identity. This section does not prohibit the
wearing of such means of concealment in good faith for the purposes of amusement,
entertainment or in compliance with any public health order."
66 221 A.C.A. at 17, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
67 208 Cal. App. 2d 87, 25 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1962).
68 Id. at 96, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
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The court believed that various provisions of the ordinance, in-
cluding a provision requiring an agreement to abide by the provi-
sions of the ordinance and the appeal procedure, took the manage-
ment and control of the district from the directors. Another con-
flict arose from provisions of the Water Code to the effect that the
district shall determine how much water shall be available for fire
protection and other uses. Finally the court stated: "The Water
Code shows an intention by the Legislature to adopt a general
and complete scheme and plan for conserving water, and regulat-
ing the production, control, distribution, and use of water by such
water districts as those involved here. 69
The above case casts some doubt upon the rights of planning
commissions, boards of supervisors, and city councils to impose
water supply capability restrictions on subdividers as a part of
the routine subdivision approval proceedings, at least when water
is to be supplied by a water district. Although this point was not
considered, the decision cites general state law7° in regard to water
matters, indicating that these matters are of state concern.
A county ordinance requiring a permit for land leveling in-
volving an area greater than five acres was before the court in
County of Colusa v. Strain.7 It was contended by the defendant
that the state, by sections 720 to 730 and section 1487 of the Streets
and Highways Code, had occupied the field. These sections protect
state and county highways from damage caused by drainage from
private lands. The purpose of the ordinance was much broader
than the state law in that it applied without reference to roads.
The court, in spite of the fact that the ordinance might prohibit
what the state law also prohibits, stated that this would cause
an invalidity only to the extent of the duplication. The ordinance
was upheld on the ground that the Streets and Highways Code
sections "do not disclose nor do they justify an inference of legis-
lative intent to exclude local regulation of land leveling.
'72 The
ordinance imposed detailed map requirements, gave certain powers to
the road commissioner, and provided for an appeal to the board of
supervisors. After disposing of the pre-emption question, the court
discussed and upheld the police power of the county. There was no
discussion, however, of another provision of the ordinance, not
involved in the case, requiring a similar permit for changing the
natural course of any channel or waterway. The court stated that
69 Id. at 97, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
70 Id. at 89, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
71 215 A.C.A. 542, 30 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1963).
72 Id. at 549, 30 Cal. Rptr. 418.
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it made no detailed exploration of the possibility of state control
because the defendant had not raised the point.
CONCLUSION
With the multiplicity of state laws and a prognosis indicating
no decrease in the activity of the Legislature, one can only predict
further inroads upon the right of local agencies to legislate. Perhaps
the impelling reason for the intrusion of the state is the need for
uniformity in many fields, particularly in view of large concentra-
tions of population, artificiality of political boundaries, and speed
of communications. The need for uniformity is especially obvious
when public morals are involved. Although the fiction persists that
everyone is presumed to know the law, it is often unreasonable to
expect a familiarity with rules of personal conduct which may vary
widely from one political entity to another. Particularly in the multi-
municipality urban situation, we are often involved with transi-
tory situations, and to ascertain all the political boundaries and
untangle the varied ordinances would be a task requiring an expert
both in law and cartography.
The above remarks are not applicable to types of local regula-
tion involving static situations such as the use of property and
ordinances affecting certain businesses.
Perhaps the Legislature should study and clarify the situations
in which it has expressed no direct intent.7 If this is not done, we
can look for continuing litigation in this area.
73 S.B. No. 1348, introduced at the 1963 regular session of the California Legis-
lature by Senators Holendahl, Lagomarsino and Christensen, would have added§ 9613, as follows, to the Government Code: "It is not the intention of the Legislature
to preempt any field, to the exclusion of counties and cities, and no statute or com-
bination of statutes shall be interpreted as evidencing any such legislative intent, unless
there is in effect a specific statutory declaration of intention of the Legislature to
pre-empt the field." This bill was not enacted into law.
